Golden Gate University School of Law

GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions

The Jesse Carter Collection

5-1-1953

Fraenkel v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Asso.
[DISSENT]
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Civil Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "Fraenkel v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Asso. [DISSENT]" (1953). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 322.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/322

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

May

FRAENKEL v.

BANK OF

.AMERICA

845

[40 C.2d 845; 256 P.2d 569]

F. No. 18745.

In Bank.

May 1, 1953.]

CARL M. FR.AENKEL, .Appellant, v. BANK OF .AMERICA
NATIONAL TRUST .AND S.A VINGS .ASSOCIATION,
as Executor, etc., Respondent.

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

Licenses-Exemptions.-Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7049, exempts
from contractors' licensing requirements any construction or
operation incidental to farming or agriculture. (Disapproving contrary construction in Bowline v. Gries) 97 Cal.App.2d
741, 218 P.2d 806.)
Id.-Contractors.-Contractors' License Law was enacted for
the safety and protection of the public against imposition
by persons inexperienced in contracting work, and for the
prevention of fraudulent acts by contractors resulting in loss
to subcontractors, materialmen, employees, and owners of
structures.
Id.-Exemptions.-In exempting construction "incidental" to
farming, agriculture and allied occupations from the licensing
requirements of contractors, the Legislature considered that
such construction would include only those structures so closely
appertaining to and necessary for the conduct of the designated occupations that they may reasonably be dissociated
from the objects and purposes of the licensing law.
Id.-Exemptions.-For a construction to be "incidental to
farming" within meaning of exemption of Contractors' License
Law, the construction must be located on a farm and must be
incidental to the farmer's own farming operations.
Constitutional Law- Class Legislation- Court Review.- All
presumptions favor a legislative classification, which can:no,,t_
be overturned by a court unless plainly arbitrary.
Agriculture-Definitions.-The terms farming, husbandry and
tillage are said to be synonymous with or the equivalent of the
term agriculture.
Licenses-Exemptions.-In determining whether a construction is "incidental to farming" within meaning of exemption
of Contractors' License Law, the factors to be considered are
the nature of the activity, its close relationship to agricul-

[1] See Cal.Jur., Licenses, § 36; Am.Jur., Licenses, § 37.
[5] See Cal.Jur., Constitutional Law, § 193; Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, § 519 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3, 4, 7-10] Licenses, § 30; [2] Licenses,
§ 21.1; [5] Constitutional Law, § 164; [6] Agriculture, § 1.
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ture and thfJ nature of the business eondueted by the person
for whom the service is rendered.
[8] Id.-Exemptions.-While specialized services on a farm, such
as installation of irrigation and drainage systems when
performed for the farmer himself and constituting an essential
contributing factor to efficient operation of his farming enterprise, are regarded as part of the general farming operation
in considering whether such construction is "incidental to
farming" within meaning of exemption of Contractors' License
Law, when the same or similar services are performed for one
who is not the owner or tenant of a farm and who is engaged
in a commercial enterprise the work loses its agricultural
character.
[9] Id.-Exemptions.-If a grain elevator is built on defendant's
farm and designed to function as an incidental part of his
own farming operations rather than as a commercial enterprise, there is a factual basis for holding such structure to
he within exemption of Contractors' License Law as a "construction or operation incidental to . . . farming."
[10] Id.-Exemptions.-Where plaintiff's complaint for balance
allegedly due for construction of a grain elevator on defendant's farm does not allege any particulars disclosing the presence of essential elements for holding such structure to be
exempt under Contractors' License Law as "incidental to farming," it is proper to sustain a demurrer to the complaint; but
where the complaint appears susceptible of amendment to set
forth the required factors, a denial of leave to amend constitutes an abuse of discretion.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco. Edward Molkenbuhr,
Judge. Reversed with directions.
Action to recover unpaid balance allegedly due for construction of a grain elevator. Judgment for defendant after sustaining demurrer to complaint without leave to amend, reversed with directions.
Jack Flinn and Carroll .F'. Jacoby for Appellant.
John W. Hutton for Respondent.
C. Ray Robinson and William B. Boone as Amici Curiae
on behalf of Respondent.
SPENCE, J.--Plaintiff sought to recover the unpaid balance
allegedly due for the construction of a grain elevator for
Gordon :B'. Williamson, who was the original defendant but

May 19fi:3J

]'RAENKJ;~L

1).

BANK OF AMERICA

847

[40 C.2d 845; 256 P.2d 569]

who died during the pendency of this appeal. Although his
representative has been substituted, said Gordon F. Williamson will be referred to as defendant herein. The trial court
gave judgment for defendant after sustaining a demurrer to
the complaint without leave to amend. There are three companion cases (S.F. Nos. 18746, 18747, and 18748) brought by
this same plaintiff against other defendants in similar circumstances, and in which the trial court made like rulings.
It has been stipulated that the decisions in those cases will
depend on the conclusions reached herein.
The trial court based its ruling solely on the proposition
1hat plaintiff was not a licensed contractor and therefore was
not entitled to enforce his claim. Plaintiff contends that the
construction work involved may come within the farming
exemption of the state licensing law; and that the complaint
is capable of amendment to show the required facts. (King
v. Mortimer, 83 Cal.App.2d 11}3, 158 [188 P.2d 502] .) An
analysis of the applicable statutory law and the underlying
public policy thereof sustains plaintiff's position.
Plaintiff's action is predicated on a written contract for
the construction of a grain elevator for defendant on the
basis of ''cost plus ten per cent.'' During the progress of
construction defendant paid plaintiff $15,286.82 on account.
Upon completion plaintiff demanded a total of $18,720.36 for
the work, and following defendant's refusal to make any
further payment, plaintiff commenced this action to recover
the claimed balance of $3,433.54, plus interest, attorneys' fees
and costs. The complaint alleged that plaintiff performed the
contract as an engineer. Defendant interposed a demurrer
on the ground that the contract, pleaded as part of the complaint, shows that plaintiff did the work as a contractor, and
that he failed to allege possession of a license to act in that
capacity. At the hearing it was stipulated that plaintiff was
registered as a professional engineer (Bus. & Prof. Code,
div. 3, ch. 7, art. 8) but that he was not licensed as a contractor (Bus. & Prof. Code, div. 3, ch. 9, art. 2). Upon the
basis of this stipulation and in accord with defendant's view
relative to the necessity of plaintiff's compliance with the
contractors' license law, the trial court sustained defendant's
demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend.
On his appeal plaintiff does not deny that under the applicable statutory law his services were rendered as ''a contractor" as that term is defined to include "any person who
undertakes to . . . construct . . . any building . . . or other
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structure" (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7026) ; that "it is unlawful
for any person to . . . act in [such] capacity . . . without
having a license therefor, unless ... par·tim~lady exempted
. . . " (Ibid. § 7028; emphasis added); and that "no person
. . . acting in [such] capacity may . . . maintain any action
in any court of this State for the collection of compensation
for the performance of any act or contract for which a license
is required . . . without alleging and proving that he was a
duly licensed contractor at all times during the performance
of such act or contract" (Ibid. § 7031; emphasis added).
However, plaintiff contends that the work he performed was
within the following exemption provisions of section 7049 of
said code: "This chapter does not apply to any construction
or operation incidental to the construction and repair of irrigation and drainage ditches of regularly constituted irrigation
districts, reclamation districts, or to fanning, dairying, agricultttre, viticulture, horticulture, or stock or poultry raising,
or clearing or other work upon land in rural districts for fire
prevention purposes, except when performed by a licensee
under this chapter.'' (Emphasis added.)
[1] In Kelly v. Hill, 104 Cal.App.2d 61, 63 [230 P.2d
864], the language of section 7049 was, in our opinion, correctly analyzed and construed so as to exempt, as plaintiff
here maintains, ''any construction or operation incidental to
. . . farming . . . agriculture. . . . " A different construction of the exemption was made in Bowline v. Gries, 97 Cal.
App.2d 741, 745 [218 P.2d 806], so as "to detach 'incidental'
from farming and apply it only to certain work of irrigation
and reclamation districts" rather than extend it to the succeeding clause of the provision. Such severance in the connected
phraseology of the exemption. does not appear to correlate
with its intended scope, and it is therefore disapproved.
However, there now arises the question of what "construction" is "incidental to farming" or "agriculture." Manifestly, the IJegislature did not intend that the construction of
every structure bearing a possible relation to the farming
industry would be exempt from the contractors' license law
as "incidental to farming." [2] That law was enacted for
the safety and protection of the public against imposition by
persons inexperienced in contracting work, and for the prevention of fraudulent acts by contractors resulting in loss to
subcontractors, materialmen, employees, and owners of structures. (Loving & Evans v. Blick, 33 Cal.2d 603, 609 [204 P.2d
23] ; Franklin v. Nat. C. Goldstone Agency, 33 Cal.2d 628,
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632 [204 P.2d 37] .) [3] In exempting construction "incidental" to farming, agriculture, and allied occupations from
the licensing requirements, the Legislature undoubtedly considered that such construction would include only those structures RO closely appertaining to and necessary for the conduct
of the designated occupations that they may reaso~bly be
dissociated from the objects and purposes of the licensing
law. Thus, the Legislature may well have had in mind prevailing conditions in many rural districts where there are
few, if any, licensed contractors and where other persons in
the area having the necessary training and experience are
readily available for doing various construction jobs as the
need may arise. Moreover, many farmers themselves develop
special skill in various construction trades qualifying them
for contracting among themselves for undertaking the erection
of structural improvements upon neighboring farms and yet
they are not regularly licensed for such occasionally performed
work. [4] But consistent with such practical considerations
underlying the exemption in question, we are of the opinion
that the construction must be located on a farm and must be
incidental to the farmer's own farming operations in order
to be "incidental to farming," within the meaning of the
exemption.
[5] All presnmptions favor the legislative classification,
which cannot be overtnrned unless plainly arbitrary. (Bor
den's l?a?"rn Products Co., Inc. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, 209210 [55 S.Ct. 187, 79 I1.Ed. 281] ; In re Cardinal, 170 Cal.
519, 521 [150 P. 348, L.R.A. 1915F 850]; County of Los
Angeles v. Hurlbut, 44 Cal.App.2d 88, 93-94 [111 P.2d 963] ;
see, also, 5 Cal.Jur., § 19:3, p. 832.) If the Legislature could
have acted upon any conceivably reasonable ground, the courts
must assume that the Legislature acted upon such basis.
In short, the I1egislatnre 's judgment "on the question whether
or not a particular provision shall be made for any class of
nases, and as to the classification thereof, is not to be interferect with except for very grave causes and where it is clear
beyond reasonable doubt that no sound reason for the legislative classification, and for the different provisions regarding
the same, exists.'' (Cohen v. City of Alameda, 168 Cal. 265,
267 [142 P. 885).)
The premise of a "farming" exemption has been the subject
of frequent comment in cases involving the application of
workmen's compensation or unemployment insurance acts
where "farm labor" or "agricultural labor" is excluded from
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the operation of such laws. (Annots. in 7 A.L.R. 1296, 13 A.L.R.
955, 35 A.L.R. 208, 43 A.L.R. 954, 107 A.L.R. 977, 140 A.L.R.
399; 139 A.L.R. 1164, 146 A.L.R. 1318.) "Agriculture," according to Webster's New International Dictionary, Second
Edition, is "the art or science of cultivating the ground, and
raising and harvesting crops . . . '' [6] The terms farming, husbandry and tillage are said to be synonymous of or
equivalent to the term agriculture. (3 C.J.S. p. 366.) [7] The
purport of such legislative exemption envisages the integral
association of the work in question with farming or agriculture. (California Emp. Com. v. Kovacevich, 27 Cal.2d 546,
560 [165 P.2d 917] .) Not only are the nature of the
activity and its close relationship to agriculture among the
elements to be considered, but an additional factor is the
nature of the business conducted by the person for whom the
service is rendered. [8] Thus, specialized services on a
farm, such as the installation of irrigation and drainage
systems when performed for the farmer himself and constituting an essential contributing factor to the efficient operation of his farming enterprise, are regarded as part of the
general farming operation (Irvine Co. v. California Emp.
Com., 27 Cal.2d 570, 574, 582-583 [165 P.2d 908]), but
when the same or similar services are performed for one who
is not the owner or tenant of a farm and who is engaged in a
commercial enterprise, the work loses its agricultural character ( CalifMn~:a Emp. Com. v. Butte Co1tnty etc. A.ssn.,
25 Cal.2d 624, 639 [154 P.2d 892] ; see, also, Machinery Eng1:necring Co. v. Nickel, 101 Cal.App.2d 748, 751 [226 P.2d
78]). This same concept appears to have equally proper
application in determining whether or not construction work
is ''incidental to farming.''
[9] So here, if the grain elevator was built on defendant's
farm and designed to function as an incidental part of his
own farming operations rather than as a commercial enterprise (see Machinery Engineering Co. v. Nickel, supra, 101
Cal.App.2d 748, 751), there would be a factual basis for
holding such structure to be within the terms of the exemption as a ''construction or operation incidental to . . . farming." [10] Plaintiff's complaint does not allege any particulars disclosing whether or not these essential elements
are present. Such allegations are necessary to show, as a matter of pleading under the state contractors' license law, that
plaintiff needed no license while performing the construction
work in question, and to avoid the requirement of section 7031
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that a license must be alleged. In these circumstances the
demurrer to plaintiff's complaint was properly sustained; but
since the complaint on its face appears susceptible of amendment to set forth the required factors, the denial of leave
to amend constituted an abuse of discretion.
'l'he judgment is reversed with directions to give plaintiff
a reasonable time within which to amend his complaint if he
be :-;o advised.
Uibson, U. ,J., Shenk, .J ., Edmonds, J., and Traynor, ,J.,
concurred.
CARTER, J.--I concur in the judgment of reversal but I
do not agree with the limited and narrow interpretation placed
by the majority upon the exemption provisions of section
7049 of the Business and Professions Code and neither do I
agree with the attempt of the majority to reaffirm the holding of this court in California Ernp. Corn. v. Kovacevich,
27 Cal.2d 546 [165 P.2d 917] and California Ernp. Corn. v.
Butte County etc. Assn., 25 Cal.2d 624 [154 P.2d 892], in
both of which cases I dissented and still adhere to the views
expressed in my dissents.
The majority opinion states" But consistent with such practical considerations underlying the exemption in question,
we are of the opinion that the construction must be located
on a farm and must be incidental to the farmer's own farming operations in order to be 'incidental to farming,' within
the meaning of the exemption.'' In my opinion this is altogether too narrow a construction to place upon the language
contained in section 7049 of the Business and Professions
Code quoted in the majority opinion. In my opinion many
situations may arise where construction work of various types
may be "incidental to farming" where the construction work
is not performed on a farm, and I think it is unwise to lay
clown such a narrow definition in a case such as this, where
it is remanded to the trial court to determine as a question
of faet whether or not the construction work here involved was
''incidental to farming.''
Schauer, J., concurred.

